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Abstract
We quantify the welfare effects of zone pricing, or setting common prices across
distinct markets, in retail oligopoly. Although monopolists can only increase profits
by price discriminating, this need not be true when firms face competition. With novel
data covering the retail home improvement industry, we find that Home Depot would
benefit from finer pricing but that Lowe’s would prefer coarser pricing. Zone pricing
softens competition in markets where firms compete, but it shields consumers from
higher prices in rural markets, where firms might otherwise exercise market power.
Overall, zone pricing produces higher consumer surplus than finer price discrimination does.
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Introduction

Multi-store retailers have the ability to offer different prices based on the geography of their
stores. They sometimes do, but often only to a limited extent. This is observed in home
improvement retailing, where the large retail chains charge different prices nationally but
opt not to set prices store-by-store or even by market. Instead, prices are assigned to zones
spanning several markets that differ in significant ways. If these firms were monopolists,
this would represent a missed opportunity to price discriminate and increase profits.
With competitive interaction, however, the theoretical literature has shown that price
discrimination has an ambiguous effect on both profits and consumer welfare (Thisse and
Vives 1988, Holmes 1989, Corts 1998, Dobson and Waterson 2005, Stole 2007).
In this paper, we evaluate the welfare consequences of third degree price discrimination
in retailing, accounting for the competitive interaction. We develop an empirical analysis
of retail zone pricing and apply it to new data gathered on the home improvement industry.
The existing literature on zone pricing has found the potential for large gains in profit by
adopting finer pricing; however, due to data limitations, these papers had to abstract from
the competitive interaction of firms. The aforementioned theory literature suggests that
this abstraction may even yield the incorrect sign on profit and consumer surplus changes
when firms price discriminate.
Examples abound of firms segmenting markets based on geography, including grocers
(Montgomery 1997, Allain et al. 2017, Eizenberg et al. 2018), online retailers (Seim and
Sinkinson 2016),1 and movie theaters (Dubé et al. 2017). However, little is known regarding how segmenting markets affects both consumers and firms in retail oligopoly.2 We find
that further price discrimination through finer zones exposes some, mostly rural, markets
1

The Staples price discrimination example became well known after a Wall Street Journal article noted
that prices online reflected the web user’s zip code. This article also cites the well known Amazon price
discrimination example in which Amazon temporarily charged individual customers different prices. After
much backlash, Amazon refunded the price differences. "Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’
Information," Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Jeremy Singer-Vine and Ashkan Soltani, Dec 24 2012.
2
The ambiguity of third degree price discrimination in oligopoly has been explored in other contexts, such
as in negotiated prices (Grennan 2013) and upstream wholesale prices (Villas-Boas 2009).
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to much higher prices, as firms are more able to exercise monopoly power. Finer pricing
decreases most prices in larger competitive markets. Consequently, the existing pricing
zones shield rural consumers from high prices at the expense of slightly higher prices
in urban markets. Strategic complementarity amplifies the price effects in competitive
markets, and so ignoring competitive interaction overstates profit gains from finer pricing
and understates the extent that zone pricing causes urban to rural surplus transfers. Our
results also reveal an asymmetry, as a move by both firms towards finer pricing decreases
profits for one chain but increases profits for the other.
We begin by documenting the pricing strategies used by the major home improvement
retailers by collecting store-level prices using the retailers’ websites. We obtain over
800,000 cross-sectional prices for hundreds of products across nearly 4,000 stores and
document that zone pricing is used in many, but not all, of their product categories. There is
a significant amount of heterogeneity in pricing across product categories. Some products
are uniformly priced, a fact recently documented broadly across retailers (DellaVigna and
Gentzkow 2017, Hitsch, Hortacsu, and Xiliang 2017). However, we show others have
as many as 100 prices across stores. The magnitude of price dispersion is meaningful,
as many products see a range in prices by a factor of two or three nationally. We show
that prices are assigned to pricing zones that combine distinct, and sometimes distant,
markets, where competition and input costs vary substantially. For example, one Home
Depot drywall pricing zone spans 500 miles and includes the stores in metropolitan Salt
Lake City, Utah and Boise, Idaho, as well as several stores in small, isolated towns across
Idaho, Nevada, and Wyoming.3 Although we cannot disentangle all the motives for
designing such a pricing system, we can analyze its impact on firms and consumers.
Next, we create a panel data set of daily prices and sales, which we collect by tracking
the firms’ daily inventory for drywall products at specific stores. Drywall is a product
especially suited to an analysis of zone pricing, because of the size of its zones, the price and
cost variations across space, and the detailed information available on its supply. The data
3

Drywall is sometimes called wallboard, sheet rock, or gypsum board. It is made from gypsum and other
additives and is attached to interior wall studs (interior frame). The drywall is then painted.
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are used to estimate an empirical model with competition. On the supply side, retailers
must use the same price for all stores within predetermined zones. They simultaneously
set zone prices for every product. They face store-specific costs, which we derive directly
from wholesale prices and transportation costs. For demand, we estimate a nested logit
model (Berry 1994), which incorporates preferences for product characteristics and price.
We find drywall products to be highly substitutable, which is not surprising because they
are not highly differentiated. Our cost data allow us to compare observed prices with
calculated equilibrium prices. We find that observed prices are near, but lower than,
optimal prices.
Our main analysis comes from calculating equilibria under different zone structures.
We consider all combinations of constraining firms to use uniform pricing, use their
observed zones, and use market pricing. For each scenario, we calculate equilibrium
prices, profits, and consumer welfare. Our analysis yields two main sets of findings.
First, we find market pricing would greatly alter prices and consumer surplus in some
markets. As is standard in third-degree price discrimination, we find that finer zones
brings higher prices to segments where a firm’s residual demand is more inelastic. Here,
those segments are mostly rural markets where only one chain is present. Finer pricing
decreases most prices in larger competitive markets. Thus, zone pricing yields clear winners and losers that mostly follow urban-rural divide. Finer pricing lowers consumer
surplus in noncompetitive, rural markets by $1.5 million annually while increasing consumer surplus in competitive, mainly urban markets by $0.6 million annually. Because
these markets have fewer consumers, the per capita impact of zone pricing is ten times
greater in monopoly markets. Hence, zone pricing shields mostly rural consumers from
high prices at the expense of slightly higher prices in large urban markets.
Our second finding is that there exists an asymmetry across the two chains. Lowe’s
would benefit from both chains moving to coarser pricing (4.9% higher profits), and Home
Depot would benefit if both chains moved to finer pricing (8.4% higher profits). This result
is driven by the relatively large number of monopoly stores Home Depot has in this part
of the United States. For Home Depot, softening competition through uniform pricing
3

does not outweigh the benefits from exercising market power – a possibility theorized
in (Dobson and Waterson 2005). For Lowe’s, the opposite is true. However, when we
hold the competitor’s pricing system fixed, but allow prices to update, we find each firm
always do better under finer pricing. As the theoretical literature has shown, this is not
guaranteed.
In further analysis, we single out the role that competitive interaction plays in estimating the gains from adopting finer pricing. Using the Dominck’s Finer Foods data base,
Montgomery (1997), Chintagunta, Dubé, and Singh (2003), and Khan and Jain (2005) compare zone pricing to store-level pricing in retail. These earlier analyses abstracted from
cost differences between stores and the response of competitors, both of which are important considerations in drywall and many other retail sectors. We compare an experiment
in which one chain switches to market pricing holding the competitor’s prices fixed with
the experiment where one firm chooses optimal market prices and the competitor optimal
zone prices. In the first exercise, the firm lowers price to increase market share in most
competitive markets. In the latter exercise, most prices in those markets decrease further
due to strategic complementarity. Hence, abstracting from the competitive interaction
understates price decreases in competitive markets and overstates the profit gains from
price discrimination.
Lastly, we show how decentralizing pricing would affect chain profits. Some chains
give local managers the autonomy to decide prices and product assortments. We decentralize pricing at Home Depot and Lowe’s by having stores maximize their own profits.
This leads to an agency problem, as local stores compete for sales from other allied stores
(Brickley and Dark 1987). We find the agency problem in our setting to be large; a move
from market pricing increases price dispersion (similar to the findings of Lafontaine (1999)
for fast food franchising) and decreases total chain profits by 27-40% in markets where
other chain stores are present. This may be the reason that our retailers centralize the
firm’s pricing activities.4
4

Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) show that company ownership is positively associated with brand value. It
may be that Home Depot and Lowe’s have higher brand value as compared to the home improvement retailer

4

2

Data

Home improvement warehouses have grown to have revenues exceeding $130 billion
dollars a year.5 They sell products in many product categories, ranging from building
materials to small household appliances. The three largest chains are Home Depot, Lowe’s,
and Menards. Home Depot operates 2,274 stores, Lowe’s 1,857 stores, and Menards 295
stores.6 Home Depot and Lowe’s are the fourth and eighth largest US retailers by revenue,
respectively.7
We create several new data sets with information gathered from the retailers’ websites.
First, we obtain cross-sections of store prices for all three chains for all products in drywall
and a few other categories. Next, we construct a panel of prices and quantity sold for
drywall stores in the Intermountain West for a six-month period in 2013. We then combine
these data with cost estimates based on wholesale prices and transportation costs. We
describe each of these data sets in the following subsections.

2.1

Zone Pricing Practices in Home Improvement Retail

We begin by documenting new facts regarding the magnitude of dispersion and the use
of zone pricing for the three main home improvement retailers. The retailers’ websites
present users with store-specific prices, and we record a snapshot of prices at all stores for
products in several categories.8
We collect prices for drywall, insulation panels, LED light bulbs, mosaic glass tile,
Phillips screwdrivers, plywood, roof underlayment, sanders, stone pavers, and window
film. These product categories are chosen because they vary in size, weight, price, location
of manufacturer, and availability at other local retailers and at online retailers. All of
Ace Hardware. This buyer cooperative has thousands of stores, but does not have centralized pricing.
5
Home Depot and Lowe’s alone exceed $130 billion. Source: 2016 10-Ks.
6
Home Depot: 2016 10-K ; Lowe’s: 2016 10-K; Menards: authors’ calculation. Home Depot and Lowe’s
operate stores throughout the United States and a few in Canada and Mexico. Menards operates only in the
Midwest.
7
Source: National Retail Federation. Top 100 Retailers 2014.
8
We collect these data by writing a web scraper. For each product, we set our location to each store. This
reveals the local product price.
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these factors may affect the pricing of products. Because all the retailers offer hundreds
of products in each category, to keep the collection process manageable, we randomly
sample products within each category. In total, we obtain 801,498 prices between 2013
and 2014.
Product category managers working at corporate headquarters - not local managers make pricing and assortment decisions.9 Lowe’s and Home Depot each have one pricing
manager for all drywall products, for example.
Table 1: Mean and median number of prices for products.
Category

Home Depot
Mean Median

Lowe’s
Mean Median

Menards
Mean Median

Drywall

46.45

50

37.19

32

21.51

24

Insulation

14.48

7

22.50

22

16.53

19

LED

6.23

4

3.02

3

1.62

1

Mosiac Glass Tile

2.08

1

1.66

1

2.07

2

Plywood

3.99

1

23.65

21

5.19

4

33.82

32

52.14

38

10.15

3

Sanders

3.30

3

1.31

1

1.50

1

Screwdrivers

4.93

5

6.77

3

1.01

1

Stone Pavers

8.65

2

12.43

2

6.00

2

Window Film

2.10

1.5

4.53

2

3.42

3

Roof Underlayment

Notes: Mean and median number of prices per product, weighted by store presence. Number of
observations per category (in order): 71,360, 49,203, 114,576, 83,698, 130,466, 24,048, 96,959, 100,872,
65,477, 64,839; total: 801,498.

Our first finding is that pricing strategies vary considerably across firms and across
categories within a firm. Table 1 computes the mean and median number of unique prices
for products at the category-firm level.10 For example, the second row corresponds to
9

In addition to information from people in the industry, we note that job descriptions for pricing and
assortments are category-specific. For Menards, some of the positions combine categories, such as paint and
grocery.
10
These statistics are weighted by the number of stores that carry the product. This addresses the fact that
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insulation panels. The first column numbers, (14.48, 7), show that Home Depot neither
uniformly prices insulation panels nor uses store-level pricing. The average insulation
panel has 14.48 price points, and the median number of prices is seven. The difference
comes from pricing variation within a category. For example, Lowe’s birch plywood has
51 prices, whereas Lowe’s underlayment plywood has five prices. Looking within and
across columns shows considerable variation in pricing strategies. In several categories,
all firms uniformly price almost all products, consistent with the finding in DellaVigna
and Gentzkow (2017) and Hitsch, Hortacsu, and Xiliang (2017) who document that most
of the retail chains in the Neilsen Scanner Data utilize near uniform pricing. However,
we also see that for some categories, such as drywall and roof underlayment, all employ
fine pricing. There are also important asymmetries across retailers. For plywood, Home
Depot only has 5.4 price points per product, but the number is above 23.6 for Lowe’s.
The significant heterogeneity within and across categories is interesting. Some categories are readily available both online and at most retail stores, such as LED light bulbs,
whereas others, such as drywall, are available at far fewer chains. In categories with more
competitors providing close substitutes, we would expect a chain’s residual demand to
be more elastic and its gains from maintaining many zones to be smaller. In addition to
possible demand rationales, Table 1 does show that big and bulky products, such as drywall and insulation, tend to have finer pricing than small products, such as screwdrivers
and window film (plywood is the notable exception). As pricing is delegated to category
managers, managerial ability may also play a role as we and DellaVigna and Gentzkow
(2017) hypothesize. Later, we will focus on one of the most finely priced categories to
examine the costs and profit gains brought by departures from their observed pricing
regimes.
For many of of the categories, the distinct price points are far apart. To gauge the
magnitude of price dispersion across stores, we calculate the coefficient of variation (CV).
some products are nationally stocked, and others have a regional presence. Excluding products that have
only a small presence does not affect the results.
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Across all products, the average is 0.039, and excluding uniformly priced products, 0.114.11
The relation between the number of distinct prices and CV is positive through 40 prices,
and the CV is above 0.1 when the number of prices exceeds 19. As prices become more
dense, the CV dips slightly to 0.125. Products in categories such as drywall have average
CV, but as we will soon see, this translates to significant price variation across stores.
Our second finding is that many products have large, geographically contiguous regions with constant prices. Figure 1 maps price ranges for 4’ x 8’ x 1/2" non-mold-resistant
drywall at Lowe’s. Each dot corresponds to a store location, and the color of the dot
corresponds to a price range, such as $6.98-$9.25 as the lowest bin. We plot price ranges
instead of unique prices due to the sheer number of prices in the data – in this case, 79
prices. Prices vary considerably across the United States, with the same product having
the lowest price of $6.98 and the highest price of $19.85. The map also shows coarse pricing
over large areas of the United States. For example, price dispersion is small or zero in the
Upper Midwest and Northeast. Figure 2 shows a similar story for Home Depot’s 4’ x 8’
x 1/2" mold-resistant drywall. Nationally, this product has considerable price variation,
from $7.65 to $23.71 per sheet, stemming from 93 distinct prices. Again, price dispersion
is small or zero for large regions such as in the Midwest and Pacific Northwest. These
are some of the most finely priced products in the drywall category, as Table 1 shows, the
average of 47 and 37 prices for Home Depot and Lowe’s respectively.
Figure 3 maps prices for regular 4’ x 8’ x 1/2" drywall in the Western United States.
This region is small enough that each unique price is displayed with a separate map
symbol/color. The map reveals geographically contiguous pricing zones. For example,
Washington and Oregon form a pricing zone; all stores in Idaho, Utah and Northern
Nevada form a pricing zone; and Arizona is split into two zones.

11
Our interpretation is that this suggests significant price dispersion in retailing. The magnitude is less
than for prescription drugs (Sorensen 2000). However, Cavallo (2017) notes that prices are identical between
offline and online channels 72% of the time across 56 large retailers.

8
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Figure 1: Map of prices for Lowe’s 4’ x 8’ x 5/8" non-mold-resistant drywall.
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Figure 2: Map of prices for Home Depot 4’ x 8’ x 1/2" mold-resistant drywall.

Figure 3: Map of unique prices for Home Depot 4’ x 8’ x 1/2" non-mold-resistant drywall.

The coarseness of pricing zones varies by product category, but there is also some
within-category variation. For example, compare the Home Depot mold-resistant and
non-mold-resistant 4’ x 8’ x 1/2" drywall sheets in Figure 2 and Figure 3. In Figure 2,
Western Washington and Oregon belong to two pricing zones, whereas in Figure 3, these
stores combine to form one pricing zone. Information available to Home Depot suppliers
offers the likely explanation as to why this occurs: each store is allocated to a division,
region, buying office, market, and distribution center.12 For example, the Van Nuys,
12
Sourced from The Home Depot US Store Listing, July 2010, accessed through the Home Depot supplier
portal. The Home Depot Supplier Onboarding Guide, Summer 2013, states: "Each Market is part of a Buying
Office (BYO) which was used historically when we operated multiple Buying Offices in the field."
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California store is assigned as follows: store 6661, market 48, buying office 5, distribution
174, region Pacific Central, and division Western. Zones are determined by pooling
“markets” together. Within category, the variation is explained by a manager selecting the
Western Washington (market 44) market and combining it with the Oregon market (market
54), as in the case of 4’ x 8’ x 1/2" non-mold-resistant drywall. Across-category variation is
generally explained by how many markets are pooled together to form a pricing zone.
Figure 4: Map of prices for Menards Cement Block, Model 1796300.

Finally, we note that some pricing zones are quite small. This can be seen in the previous
pricing maps and most clearly in Figure 4, which plots prices for a 12" cement block at
Menards. For example, Wisconsin is split into four zones and Minnesota is included
in five zones. Several zones contain just a few stores, such as in Northern Indiana and
Southeastern Michigan. Further, the price changes are significant, as prices vary by a
factor of two nationally.

12

2.2

Drywall Data for the Intermountain West

The previous subsection shows how prices and pricing strategy vary considerably across
the main home improvement retailers. We are interested in the effects of these strategies
on firms and consumers and, thus, require quantity data in order to conduct an empirical
analysis. Fortunately, the chains’ websites also provide information to determine product
sales. In addition to local prices, these retailers present web users with up-to-date quantityon-hand information, as shown in Figure 5. We collect this information daily, and by
differencing daily inventory, we obtain a measure of daily sales.
Figure 5: Obtaining product inventories from HomeDepot.com.

Because of data collection limitations, we narrow our focus to products and store
locations – specifically, we select drywall products and the Intermountain West. We
choose this category and region of the United States for a number of reasons: (i) locations
of drywall manufacturers are known, and costs can be estimated; (ii) drywall deliveries to
stores are infrequent, minimizing the measurement error associated with using inventory
changes to proxy sales13 ; (iii) this region captures considerable variation in competition
and costs, while keeping data collection manageable; (iv) consumer markets are small
13

This is not true for many product categories, such as paint. These products see deliveries every few days
making it difficult to infer sales from inventory.

13

since buyers are unlikely to transport bulky and fragile products over a great distance;
(v) drywall is rarely used in price promotions or as a loss leader,14 so category profitmaximization is reasonable; (vi) drywall pricing zones are large enough to be economically
interesting, but small enough that dozens of zones can be studied with a limited number
of stores; and (vii) Menards does not operate in this region, reducing the number of major
sellers to two.15
We create a data set of prices, quantities sold, and product characteristics for 75 Home
Depot stores and 53 Lowe’s stores. We download prices and inventory levels for individual
store stock keeping units (SKUs) and match these to products. For several products,
although Lowe’s lists several brands on its website as different products, the SKUs have
identical prices and inventory levels (with a one-day lag). We eliminate these duplicates.
In all, we identify 31 distinct products. We record thickness, width, length, and mold
resistance for each product. We do not use brand identifiers because our site visits found
brands frequently mislabeled at both chains.
Figure 6 maps the stores for which we obtained quantity data. Our data set includes all
stores in Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, Western Colorado, and Eastern Washington,
as well as stores in adjacent states needed to complete pricing zones. This region includes
locations where only Home Depot operates (for example, Elko, Nevada) and locations
where only Lowe’s operates (for example, Vernal, Utah). Home Depot, however, has
more such locations. Lowe’s pursued a national strategy targeting its expansion in larger,
metropolitan markets in the early 2000s, when the chains were adding stores in this
region.16
For the purposes of this study, we define a price zone as a set of stores at which all
products have the same price. Thus, these pricing zones are no larger than the uniform
14

We briefly collect local store ads and note that drywall is never advertised.
Menards did not post inventory levels at the time of data collection, although it does now. Therefore, we
select a region without Menards stores.
16
Home Depot first entered this area in 1994. It opened stores steadily until 2008. Lowe’s expanded into the
region in 1998 with its purchase of Eagle Hardware, which began Washington in 1990 and had expanded into
the Salt Lake and Billings in 1994. Lowe’s first entered New Mexico in 2000. The 2003-2005 Lowe’s Annual
Reports describe its metropolitan-focused expansion strategy.
15

14

Figure 6: Stores selected for empirical analysis.

price region for any product. Using this definition of a pricing zone, our sample contains 14
complete Home Depot pricing zones and 11 complete Lowe’s pricing zones. By comparing
prices across time, we note that zone boundaries did not change during the collection
period. Nationally, we determine that Home Depot has 165 drywall pricing zones, while
Lowe’s has 129. The Intermountain West contains several small pricing zones, as well
as one of the largest pricing zones in the nation. Further, in this area, the pricing zone
boundaries largely match between chains; however, this is not true in other parts of the
country, such as in the Eastern United States.
A notable feature of the decision to use zone pricing in retail drywall is that costs and
market structure vary considerably within a zone. Table 2 presents an example from a
large drywall pricing zone based around Salt Lake City, Utah. The Home Depot stores in
Logan, Utah, Rock Springs, Wyoming, and Elko, Nevada are all in this pricing zone, and,
hence, the prices for drywall within these stores are the same – the 4’ x 8’ x 5/8" drywall
15

Table 2: Example documenting differences in costs and competition within a zone.
Logan, UT

Home Depot Stores
Rock Springs, WY Elko, NV

Drywall Prices
mold-resistant 8’x4’x1/2”

$11.47

$11.47

$11.47

regular 8’x4’x5/8”

$10.98

$10.98

$10.98

Distances (miles)
Nearest Lowe’s

1

107

168

Nearest American Gypsum factory

743

821

491

Home Depot Distribution Center

58

177

251

$64,495

$79,150

$83,617

Demographics
Median Family Income

Notes: Reported distances are closest distances to drywall factory and flatbed distribution center.

board is $10.98. The Home Depot in Logan faces competition from Lowe’s, located a mile
away. The nearest Lowe’s to the Rock Springs and Elko stores are 107 and 168 miles away,
respectively. Further, at around 50 pounds per sheet of drywall, distance should play an
important role in costs. The distance to the nearest distribution center and the distance to
the nearest factory both vary by hundreds of miles. Profit-maximizing prices for each of
these stores should differ substantially, yet Home Depot places all three stores in the same
zone and assigns identical prices.
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the sample.17 We collect data daily between
February 12, 2013 and July 29, 2013.18 The sample includes 72,092 observations. On
average, daily inventory decreases by 11.6 and 14.7 sheets per product-store for Lowe’s
and Home Depot, respectively. This represents a small percentage of the drywall required
to build a house (typically, several hundred sheets). We posit that the sales we record
17
We exclude products that are not 4’ x 8’/10’/12’ x 1/2". These three dimensions make up over 71% of sales.
The excluded products have unique dimensions and/or thicknesses, such as 12" x 12" panels.
18
While this data set was collected, drywall installers were pursuing a lawsuit alleging price fixing by
manufacturers. We note that no similar allegations were made against drywall retailers.
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are used for small consumer projects, such as wall repair or room remodeling. General
contractors have the ability to purchase in bulk through contractor supply outlets. Thus,
new construction and bulk purchasing occur in a separate market.
Table 3: Summary statistics for the sample
Means

Lowe’s

Home Depot

Sales (per product, per day)

11.61
(38.22)

14.69
(28.80)

Delivery size (per product)

298.80
(361.75)

272.63
(263.91)

3.28
(0.45)

3.05
(0.32)

$381.12
(335.90)

$443.25
(189.40)

Price (per product)

$11.78
(2.08)

$11.82
(2.10)

Observations

31, 333

40, 759

# Products (per store)
Revenue (per store, per day)

Notes: Summary statistics for all 4’x8’x1/2", 4’x10’x1/2", and
4’x12’x1/2" drywall sheets at 128 Home Depot and Lowe’s stores.

Inventory increases of more than 15 sheets are classified as deliveries. This allows for
some returns if excess sheets are purchased. On delivery days, typically a few hundred
sheets are delivered per product-store. When deliveries occur, we impute sales for the
product as the average sales of the product, store, day-of-week series. However, we
note that our empirical analysis is not sensitive to the classification of delivery, nor how
imputed sales are handled.19 The two chains have similar drywall product selections,
19

For example, counting any small inventory increase as a delivery would only lower estimated mean price
elasticity from -5.6 to -5.3. The standard deviations are similar. Not imputing sales or dropping all positive
inventory changes also yields similar results.
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offering around three products per store.20 The price of drywall within these markets
ranges from $6.95 to $15.14 per sheet, depending on the dimensions and features. The
total drywall sales revenue for the 128 stores we study sums to $19.4 million per year.
If these sales figures are representative of average store performance, drywall sales for
Home Depot and Lowe’s total over $627 million per year nationally.

2.3

Drywall Cost Data

We create a data set of estimated marginal costs for each product at every store in our
sample, based on wholesale prices and transportation costs. Home Depot and Lowe’s
ship their drywall from manufacturer to store by way of flatbed distribution centers.21
We obtain locations for these centers from the retailers’ websites, and we obtain locations
for all drywall manufacturing factories from Global Gypsum Magazine. We calculate the
driving distance from any drywall factory to store via a flatbed distribution center. We
then convert that distance into a cost estimate by multiplying quoted prices for flatbed
shipment per mile and dividing by the number of sheets on a full flatbed truck. Within
the stores of interest, we calculate that transportation costs vary by more than $1 per
sheet. Distribution centers are usually near large markets, and Lowe’s and Home Depot
distribution centers are often near each other, so differences in transportation costs within a
market are often smaller. One big difference is Home Depot’s placement of a distribution
center in northern Utah, whereas the nearest Lowe’s distribution center is in southern
Nevada.
We estimate the manufacturer’s price at the factory gate using confidential Bureau of
Labor Statistics microdata. Wholesale price estimates are the only place where we use
Bureau of Labor Statistics data; all other data are independently collected. To estimate
wholesale prices in a way that preserves confidentiality, we construct a reduced-form
regression of price on mold resistance, transaction characteristics, and month indicators.
20

Including sizes other than 4’ x 8’/10’/12’ x 1/2", yields roughly eight products per store on average.
We determine this using Google Maps. By examining street views of their flatbed distribution centers
(FDC), we note instances of drywall being unloaded. Hence, we assume that drywall is shipped from the
manufacturer to FDC, and then to stores.
21
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Thus, we generate separate monthly wholesale prices for mold-resistant and regular products, but data limitations and confidentiality concerns force us to ignore wholesale price
differences between chains or between manufacturing locations. Within each month, differing transportation distances and product characteristics determine all cost variation.
We omit other sources of costs, including labor costs, warehousing costs at the distribution center, checkout transaction fees, and the opportunity cost of store floor space. Our
transportation costs are also a lower bound as we assume the source of the drywall is the
closest manufacturer. This potentially causes cost estimates to be too low. However, if one
of the chains negotiates contract with a wholesale price below the industry average, cost
calculations might be too high. For comparison, we also estimate costs using a model of
supply in Appendix A.

3

Model of Zone Pricing in Oligopoly

In this section, we introduce the structural model of demand and supply under zone
pricing. For demand, we pursue a nested logit demand system (Berry 1994). For supply,
we model a pricing game in which chains sell multiple differentiated products across
multiple stores, but are restricted to use their observed pricing zones. Conditional on
these zones, chains simultaneously choose prices to maximize category profits.

3.1

Nested Logit Demand

Consumers are distributed across several locations, with a generic location denoted `.
Consumer i at location ` decides to purchase a single product or chooses option 0, which
corresponds to not purchasing any of the available products in the market. Let s be a
generic store at location `, and let j be a particular product. We suppress the time subscript
t for ease of exposition. Each consumer solves the discrete choice utility maximization
problem; that is, i chooses j, s if and only if ui js ≥ ui j0 s0 , ∀ j0 × s0 ∈ J` ∪ {0}, where J` denotes
the choice set at `.
We pursue a nested logit demand system in which products are partitioned into groups
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(nests). Let c denote a nest. The outside good, corresponding to j = 0, belongs to its own
nest. We assume that utility is linear in product characteristics, and equal to
ui js = δ js + ζic (λ) + (1 − λ)εi js .
In the formulation above, the mean utility of product j at s is equal to
δ js = x js β − α` p js + ξ js ;
x js are product characteristics; p js is price; (β, α` ) are preferences over product characteristics, ξ js is unobservable to the econometrician; and εi js is an independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) unobservable having a Type-1 extreme value distribution. The decision
not to purchase a good yields a normalized utility, ui`0 = εi`0 . Finally, ζic (λ) is common
to all products in nest c and depends on the nesting parameter λ ∈ [0, 1]. Cardell (1997)
shows that ζic (λ) + (1 − λ)εi js has a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution, leading
to the nested logit demand model. As λ → 1, products within nests are increasingly close
substitutes, and, in the limit, when λ = 1, there is no substitution outside of the nest. If
λ = 0, the model collapses to the logit demand model. Integrating over the GEV unobservables yields analytic expressions for the purchase probabilities, σ js = σ`c · σ js/c . Following
Berry (1994), the choice probabilities can be inverted to reveal a linear estimating equation,
log(s js ) − log(s`0 ) = x js β − α` p js + λ log(s js|c ) + ξ js ,

(3.1)

where s js , s`0 , and s js|c are the empirical counterpart to the theoretical purchase probabilities
(σ). Prices may be correlated with the unobserved error term (ξ) and category shares
are mechanically correlated with the error term, but since Equation 3.1 is linear in its
parameters, we instrument for these endogenous variables, as discussed in Section 4.1.
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3.2

Supply with Zone Pricing

With the demand system defined, we now introduce the pricing game. Firms simultaneously choose pricing on all products, but these pricing choices are constrained to be the
same at all of the firm’s stores within a price zone. The pricing zones are made outside of
the model; section Section 5 investigates equilibrium with alternate pricing regimes.
Let stores of each firm be partitioned in zones, indexed by z. Zone pricing implies that
for every product j,
p js = p js0 , ∀s, s0 ∈ z,

(3.2)

where s, s0 denote stores belonging to zone z. Let Z f be the set of all zones for firm f . Let
c js denote the marginal cost of product j at store s. There are no fixed costs. The profits a
firm accrues by selling product j across the network of stores are
XX


f
(p jz − c js )q js ,
π j p f ; p− f , Z :=
z∈Z f

(3.3)

s∈z

where q js = M` s js , M` is the market size corresponding to the location of store s, and
s js = σ js (X, p, ξ; θ) corresponds to the market share defined in Section 3.1. Implicitly, only
zones and stores that offer j are included in the sum. Note, also, the subscript on price (jz)
incorporates the constraint in Equation 3.2.
As firms sell multiple products across stores, total firm profits for the category are


 X f
π j p f ; p− f , Z .
π f p f ; p− f , Z :=

(3.4)

j

Equilibrium prices are such that, given the prices of the other firm, each firm maximizes
its total profits subject to the zone pricing constraint.
Our model abstracts from bundles, both in the decision to purchase a basket of goods
related to drywall and in the pricing of drywall and complementary products. For example, on the supply side, a chain could set its drywall prices below the level that maximizes
drywall profits in order to sell more paint brushes. However, drywall is rarely advertised
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and it is unlikely to be loss leader.
Analyzing only one product in a potential bundle can cause biased demand estimates
(Kim and Kim 2017), which propagate to pricing and welfare calculations. With the
data collected, we show that many of the products bought with drywall are uniformly
priced. This suggests that price adjustments to products in the basket will affect overall
chain preference and current price levels will be absorbed in our coefficient for the overall
chain effect. This lowers our concern that abstracting from a basket of goods causes us
to overstate market power (Thomassen et al 2017). Nonetheless, if the demand estimates
ascribes unmodeled shopping cost considerations to idiosyncratic preferences, then we
may overstate the ability of firms to increase prices in monopoly markets, understate price
declines in competitive markets, and understate the consumer surplus impact of price
changes. Yet, as we will see, our demand system suggests fairly elastic demand and we
find substantial switching between products and stores in counterfactual experiments.
Finally, we compare optimal prices given our demand system to observed prices. They
are close which mitigates some of our concerns that the demand model is misspecified.

4
4.1

Estimation and the Observed Zone Pricing Regime
Demand

We invert market shares, as shown in Berry (1994), to obtain the linear estimating equation
in Equation 3.1. This equation relates observed market shares to the mean utility from
purchasing product j, s. Included in x are dummy variables for product length, fixed
effects for market, seasonality indicators, an indicator for mold-resistance, and a chain
indicator for (Home Depot, Lowe’s). We allow heterogeneity in demand across locations
through market indicators, by interacting price with local family income (α` ), and through
the unobservable that varies for each product-store pair (ξ). We aggregate data to the twoweek level because we observe zero product sales at the daily level. Price adjustments are
not frequent; we observe at most four prices for a product over the sample period. When
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we observe a price adjustment within the two-week window, we compute the average
price weighted by sales.
Three choices remain to complete the demand specification: the definition of the
market, the share of the outside good, and the choice of nest. We define a market to
be a Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) over a two-week period. For stores not located
within CBSAs, we set the market to be the county in which the store resides. With this
interpretation of markets, each location ` usually has several stores from both Home Depot
and Lowe’s, and a consumer, on average, chooses between seven products. Further, given
the structure of both firms’ pricing zones, zones overlap into several markets; however,
in no situations do markets overlap zones. We take market size to be proportional to the
2010 county population to define the outside good share. We nest products by the moldresistance characteristic. Although drywall is overall highly substitutable, mold-resistance
panels are recommended for bathrooms and kitchens. Standard panels are used elsewhere
because these panels generally weigh less and are more fire-resistant. Drywall often is
trimmed to length, so we expect (and find) 8’, 10’, and 12’ panels to be highly substitutable.
Two sources of endogeneity arise from the inversion of market shares. The first is that
unobserved product quality may be correlated with price. The second is that within-group
share is naturally correlated with the unobserved error term, ξ. We use an instrumental
variables approach to deal with this endogeneity issue. Our list of instruments includes:
marginal costs; sum and count of all products and product characteristics at both allied
stores in the market and competing stores in the market; and a Hausman instrument –
average prices for a given product in other markets where the product is offered. As we
may be concerned that zones are endogenous, the Hausman instrument utilizes far away
markets (more than 300 miles) outside the focal zone.
We estimate two versions of the demand model. First, we set λ = 0 in the nested
logit model so that the nests do not matter. We then estimate λ along with the demand
parameters. The results of the demand estimation appear in Table 4. Across both specifications, we find that consumers are price-sensitive and that the sign on the Home Depot
indicator is positive. In the nested logit model, we estimate λ =0.878, suggesting high
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Table 4: Demand estimation results
(1)
Logit
-0.301∗∗∗
(0.117)

(2)
Nested Logit
-0.110∗∗
(0.0483)

Income*Price

0.00124
(0.00144)

0.000484
(0.000569)

Chain

0.424∗∗∗
(0.0254)

0.0474∗
(0.0252)

Mold resistance

-1.201∗∗∗
(0.0920)

-1.792∗∗∗
(0.0559)

I[length = 10]

-1.698∗∗∗
(0.102)

-0.0928
(0.0991)

I[length = 12]

-1.269∗∗∗
(0.116)

0.0824
(0.0837)

Price

λ

0.878∗∗∗
(0.0551)

Market indicators

Yes

Yes

Month indicators
Mean product elas.
(s.d.)
Observations

Yes
-2.513
(0.486)
5,054

Yes
-5.570
(2.433)
5,054

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Income measured in thousands of dollars per year.
∗

p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

substitutability within nest. The coefficient estimate on the income variable is small and
positive (and statistically insignificant), suggesting income effects are not important. This
seems reasonable given the product studied.22 We estimate statistically significant and
negative parameters on the length dummy variables in the logit model; however, these
22

Removing income from the model yields similar results, and hence, very similar counterfactual predictions.
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parameters become insignificant and of mixed sign in the nested logit model. Finally, we
estimate a negative coefficient on the mold-resistance indicator, as the additional weight
and lower fire-resistance that comes with mold-resistance makes them less desirable for
most rooms in a home.
As Petrin (2002) notes, adding model flexibility greatly decreases the reliance on the
unobserved error term. We confirm that finding by noting that the mean product elasticity
increases from -2.5 to -5.6 from the logit to the nested logit model. This confirms that
drywall is a highly substitutable product.
We estimate the industry elasticity of drywall to be -0.7. The price insensitivity of
drywall consumption is to be expected, as drywall accounts for a small portion of expenditures on almost any project in which it is used. The industry as measured here,
however, comprises only Home Depot and Lowe’s, and the inelastic demand suggests
limited substitution to the contractor suppliers and lumberyards included in the outside
good. In other product sectors, competition from other physical and online retailers likely
makes chain-specific demand more price elastic, lowering the gains from price discrimination. In Holmes (1989) and Corts (1998) industry price elasticity is a main determinant
of whether price discrimination is profitable, so a more elastic demand may be why so
many categories other than drywall have uniform pricing or fewer, larger zones.

4.2

Marginal Costs and Optimal Pricing

Our wholesale price and transportation cost data allows the computation of marginal costs
without the assumption of optimal pricing. We, thus, can compare observed pricing with
optimal prices. To find equilibrium zone prices, we sequentially solve the best-response
functions of the firms, fixing zones, until convergence.
Figure 7 plots a histogram of percent differences between observed prices and equilibrium prices. We find observed prices to be, on average, 9.2% lower than optimal (median
7.4%). The histogram shows that most optimal prices are between -10% and 20% with
observed prices. There are a few outliers, mostly in the direction of prices being too low.
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This may seem problematic; however, the highest equilibrium price is still within $0.50
with observed prices in the national data. Further, the products that see large price increases do not drive our main results; they account for only 2.6% of total chain profits.23
For data confidentiality reasons, we cannot report firms’ average markups, but markups
on individual products range from -0.9% to 38% with observed prices and from 16% to
69% with equilibrium zone prices.24 The means are similar.

Figure 7: Histogram of differences in equilibrium zone prices with observed zone prices,
as percentage
Other studies have found observed prices to be lower than optimal. For example,
Nair (2007) finds prices to be slightly lower than optimal in a setting of intertemporal
price discrimination. On the other hand, Dubé and Misra (2017) find an online recruiting
website charged prices far below optimal. Also, our retailers may have considerations
that are not captured in our model. Firms may have fairness concerns as hypothesized in
23
24

The outliers are a single product in three of the smallest Home Depot zones.
38 out of 5,054 observations are estimated to have a negative markup using observed prices.
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DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2017). Or, firms may have long-run considerations in mind;
prices are lower as a consequence of higher elasticities than our model provides.
In many studies, direct measures of costs are absent, and so a common approach
is to recover costs by assuming observed prices maximize firm profits. Appendix A
extends this procedure to zone pricing, where the standard estimation routines would be
underidentified – zone pricing produces only J × Z optimality conditions to solve for J × S
marginal cost terms. That is, costs vary by store but optimality conditions are specific to a
more aggregated level, zones.
In the appendix, we compare the resulting costs with those computed from our wholesale shipping data. The transportation component of costs estimated by the two methods
are similar. The overall costs, however, are lower when recovered from optimality conditions, possibly due to our retailers securing lower wholesale prices than the national
average. For some products, marginal costs implied by optimal pricing are unrealistic;
for these, unobservable components of costs of high magnitudes, both positive and negative, are required to make the optimality conditions hold. This could be because our
assumption that firms are choosing the optimal prices in incorrect or because our restrictive assumption needed in order to recover costs does not hold. Therefore, we use the
costs described in Section 2.3 in the subsequent sections.
Before turning to counterfactuals, we report additional statistics on profits for the
retailers, comparing observed prices with equilibrium zone prices. Table 5 calculates
profits by chain and market type under both prices. The most important finding is that
the percent of profits attributed to either firm in duopoly and monopoly markets does
not change substantially going from observed to equilibrium prices. This mitigates the
concern that the price outliers in Figure 7 determine much of firm profit. Next, we find
that a larger percentage of firm profit comes from stores located in Home Depot monopoly
markets. This makes sense, as in our sample, Lowe’s has 17 fewer monopoly stores than
Home Depot. Finally, we note that profits are much higher under equilibrium zone prices
than under observed pricing (77% for Lowe’s and 40% for Home Depot).25
25

Large gains have been found in other industries. Dubé and Misra (2017) find Ziprecruiter was charging
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Table 5: Zone Pricing Profits By Chain and Market Type
equilibrium
(observed)

Lowe’s

Home Depot
% of π
Profits

% of π

Profits

Monopoly

7.39%
(8.14%)

0.156
(0.097)

28.46%
(24.28%)

1.327
(0.815)

Duopoly

92.61%
(91.86%)

1.952
(1.094)
2, 107, 897
1, 190, 993

71.54%
(75.72%)

3.337
(2.541)
4, 664, 205
3, 356, 120

π - equilibrium
π - observed

Notes: Duopoly means that there is a competitor’s store in the market (CSBA). Profits are annualized.
Numbers in parentheses are with observed prices and others are calculated with equilibrium zone prices.

5

Alternative Pricing Regimes

The model parameter estimates allow us to calculate what equilibrium prices would result
if chains partitioned their stores into different pricing zones. Each set of partitions brings a
different Bertrand-Nash pricing game. There are millions of zone combinations, so we explore only the nine combinations that follow from firms choosing between uniform, zone,
and marketing pricing. We use the model equilibrium using the observed pricing zones
as the baseline model. Hence, all price comparisons are between computed equilibrium
prices, not observed prices.
Comparing alternative pricing regimes reveals how the observed zones soften competition in competitive markets and protect consumers in other markets. We first investigate
prices of the different combinations in Section 5.1, and then discuss variable profits and
consumer welfare in Section 5.2. We discuss the Nash equilibrium of a zone selection game
in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, we describe how omitting equilibrium consideration produces inflated estimates of the gains from finer pricing. Finally, we investigate store-level
pricing in Section 5.5.
too low for job listings on its platform and optimized prices increased revenues by 81.5%.
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For notational purposes, each pricing game we consider is denoted by the pricing
methods chains use, with Lowe’s method listed first. For example, the (zone, market)
denotes a pricing game in which Lowe’s uses its current observed zones and Home Depot
uses market-level pricing.

5.1

Equilibrium Pricing Under Alternative Pricing Zones

We first consider the (zone, market) counterfactual, in which Lowe’s retains its observed
zone structure, but Home Depot switches to setting prices market-by-market. As with all
the counterfactuals considered, prices are optimal given the specified pricing structure.
Relative to the pricing equilibrium for (zone, zone), prices at Home Depot are lower in 77%
of markets where it competes with Lowe’s and higher in 82% of markets where Lowe’s
is absent.26 The equilibrium price under zone pricing is a compromise between markets
where a high price would be most profitable and markets where a low price would be
most profitable. Because the pricing zones tie prices in monopoly markets with prices in
competitive markets, monopoly power is not fully exercised.
With market-level pricing, however, the price in monopoly markets is not constrained
by the need to keep customers in a distant, competitive market. Prices in Home Depot’s
monopoly markets are 50% higher, on average, than when both firms utilize zone pricing.
In markets with both chains, Home Depot’s prices are 3.6% lower and Lowe’s prices are
1.8% lower than in the (zone, zone) equilibrium. To respond to a lower competitor price in
this scenario, Lowe’s must lower prices throughout its zone. The profits from preserving
its high prices in its monopoly markets dull the incentives to reciprocate on price decreases.
Market-level pricing also affords chains the flexibility to post higher prices in places
with higher costs or with higher demand. Demands differ across markets due to variation
in local-level preferences. Transportation costs differ by store and vary by as much as
$0.65/sheet in some zones. Equilibrium prices for Home Depot are slightly higher in
(zone, market) than (zone, zone) in some competitive markets that are far from distribution
26

In Home Depot’s monopoly markets, 16% of prices decrease in Home Depot’s move to market-level
pricing. These prices are in zones where most of the stores are in monopoly markets.
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centers. Yet market power considerations have a greater impact on prices. Among all nonmold-resistant panels, for example, the lowest (zone, market) equilibrium price in a Home
Depot monopoly market is still higher than at any Home Depot store in a market with a
Lowe’s store.
Next, we consider the (market, zone) counterfactual, in which Lowe’s uses marketlevel pricing, and Home Depot uses its observed zones. We find that equilibrium prices
follow a pattern similar to that of the previous exercise. Lowe’s raises prices in all of its
monopoly markets and generally lowers prices elsewhere. Equilibrium prices increase
by 81% in Lowe’s monopoly markets. In markets where it competes with Home Depot,
Lowe’s equilibrium prices in this experiment are lower for 72% of products, and its average
price is only 2% less than in the (zone, zone) computed equilibrium.
The (market, market) game also has lower prices in most competitive markets and
higher prices in both chains’ monopoly markets. Chains continue to use the monopoly
price in their monopoly markets. Home Depot’s prices are the same as in the other
experiments in which it uses market-level pricing; likewise for Lowe’s. In markets where
the two chains compete, prices are still lower than in the (zone, zone), (market, zone),
or (zone, market) equilibria. In the previous experiments, the chain with zone pricing
moderated its response to its competitor’s price cuts in order to maintain profits in its
monopoly markets. In market-level pricing, each firm’s best response is more sensitive
to its competitor’s price due to strategic complementarity, and the equilibrium prices are,
therefore, lower. Average prices in duopoly markets are 2.5% lower than in the (market,
zone) subgame, 1.1% percentage points lower than in the (zone, market) subgame, and
3.7% lower than in (zone, zone). Prices for particular products are also more dispersed
in the (market, market) equilibrium, as differences in costs and market power are not
averaged out within a zone.
Figure 8 shows a histogram of price differences between the (market, market) and
(zone, zone) equilibria. Monopoly stores and duopoly stores have separate histogram
bars. A few duopoly prices are much lower under (market, market), but most price
changes are within a few percentage points of the average, -3.7%. The average price
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Figure 8: Histogram of differences in zone prices and market prices, as percentage

change for monopoly markets is 50% for Home Depot and 81% for Lowe’s, just as in
the other subgames. Some prices in monopoly markets are nearly the same in the two
subgames; these are for products in small zones comprised mostly of other monopoly
markets. Excluding these observations, we find that prices increase by 50% or even
double in (market, market) pricing, depending on local costs, local demand, and what
margins the zone price already includes.
Finally, we run counterfactual experiments in which at least one firm uses uniform
pricing. Several of Home Depot’s zones comprise mostly monopoly markets. The difference between zone and uniform pricing is, therefore, much like the difference between
market and zone pricing, in that it ties the prices in monopoly markets to prices in a much
larger set of markets with competition. In Home Depot’s zone with mostly monopoly
markets, prices are lower when they use uniform pricing; elsewhere, uniform pricing
produces higher prices. Prices at Home Depot are 4.8% lower in the (uniform, uniform)
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equilibrium compared to the (zone, zone) equilibrium. Lowe’s has fewer monopoly markets, and most of them are in large zones dominated by competitive markets. For Lowe’s,
uniform prices are similar to equilibrium zone prices. The average price in the (uniform,
uniform) counterfactual equilibrium is only 0.3% higher than in the (zone, zone) pricing
model equilibrium. The uniform prices that a firm chooses depend on its competitor’s
prices and pricing schemes, but the response is small. Lowe’s prices are $0.12/sheet higher
in (uniform, zone) than in (uniform, uniform) and are $0.32 higher in (uniform, market).
Home Depot’s equilibrium prices are $0.11/sheet higher in (zone, uniform) than in the
(uniform, uniform) and are a $0.26/sheet higher in (market, uniform).

5.2

Firm Variable Profits and Consumer Surplus

With estimated variable costs and equilibrium prices and quantities for each combination
of pricing regimes, we can calculate profits minus fixed costs, or variable profits. Table 6 reports annualized variable profits for Lowe’s and Home Depot, respectively, for all
combinations of the use of uniform, zone, and market pricing.27
Table 6: Variable Profits in Different Pricing Regimes
Lowe’s / Home Depot

Uniform Pricing

Zone Pricing

Market Pricing

Uniform Pricing

2.215 , 4.522

2.097 , 4.672

1.844 , 5.170

Zone Pricing

2.222 , 4.500

2.108 , 4.664

1.860 , 5.167

Market Pricing

2.325 , 4.344

2.220 , 4.519

1.995 , 5.055

Notes: Profits are annualized and reported as millions of dollars.

Our first finding is that finer pricing increases a chain’s own variable profits, holding
fixed the competitor’s pricing choice. For example, if Lowe’s continues in its current
27
Profit estimates are calculated from Equation 3.3 and Equation 3.4 using the equilibrium prices for p f , p− f
and the estimated costs for c js . Period profits are summed over all 13 fortnights, then doubled to produce
annualized totals. These profits are only for the 128 stores in the Intermountain West, which comprise 3% of
the chains’ national store count.
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zones but adjusts prices, Home Depot’s profits increase with finer pricing, from $4.500
million/year in (zone, uniform) to $4.664 million/year in (zone, zone) to $5.167 million/year
in (zone, market). Note also that finer pricing decreases a competitor’s profit as it brings
lower equilibrium prices to competitive markets due to strategic complementarity. As
Home Depot uses finer pricing, Lowe’s variable profits decrease from $2.222 million/year
in (zone, uniform) to $2.108 million/year in (zone, zone) to $1.860 million/year in (zone,
market). Lowe’s gains and Home Depot loses as Lowe’s moves from uniform to zone to
market-level pricing, but the gains from finer pricing are larger for Home Depot because
it has more stores in monopoly markets.
Next, we look at the situations where firms choose the same pricing system (the
diagonal entries in Table 6). We find that as pricing becomes more flexible, one chain
benefits, and one chain is worse off. A move from the current (zone, zone) structure to
a (market, market) regime would increase industry profits, but it would decrease Lowe’s
profits. Lowe’s earns $1.995 million/year in the (market, market) equilibrium, which is
$0.113 million/year, or 5.7%, less than in the (zone, zone) equilibrium. Lowe’s losses
are smaller than Home Depot’s gains of $0.391 million/year, or 8.4%, using the model
parameters we estimate. However, the same exercises run with slightly less consumer
substitution between stores would have different results. If the nesting parameter λ in the
demand system (introduced in Section 3.1) were less than 0.75, instead of its estimated
value of 0.88, then finer pricing would bring lower industry profits, a possibility theorized
in Holmes (1989).
One of the key drivers of the asymmetry in profit changes is the difference in the
number of monopoly stores across firms. For both firms, profits in competitive markets
are in aggregate lower in the (market, market) than in the (zone, zone) equilibrium. For
Lowe’s the difference is $0.261 million/year, for Home Depot it is $0.171 million/year.
Home Depot has 21 monopoly markets, in them profits are $0.561 million/year higher
in (market, market) than in (zone, zone) equilibrium. Thus, profits increase overall for
Home Depot when both chains move to finer pricing. In contrast, Lowe’s only has four
monopoly markets and these stores increase profits by only $0.148 million/year. Lowe’s
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total profits are lower in the (market, market) game as the benefits of monopoly pricing
for only a few stores does not outweigh the profit declines where the firm competes with
Home Depot.
Distribution center placement is a modest contributor of the asymmetry. With a distribution center at the center of the large zone in Utah, Idaho, and surroundings, Home Depot
has more cost variation within its zones. Home Depot’s (market,market) prices depart
farther from its (zone,zone) prices, allowing it to gain market share in large, competitive
markets in northern Utah.28
Given the specified demand system, consumer surplus for a particular market can be
calculated as
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where, implicitly, we sum over only the relevant store-products for the particular market
P
and time period. Aggregate consumer surplus is simply CS = ` CS` . Table 7 reports
consumer surplus differences between the (zone, zone) equilibrium and the (uniform,
uniform) and (market, market) subgame equilibria. Relative to (zone, zone), consumer
surplus is $0.926 million/year lower in the (market, market) subgame. Consumers in
markets served by only one chain are exposed to monopoly prices under market-level
pricing, and their consumer surplus is $1.555 million/year lower because of this. Prices
are lower in market-level pricing in duopoly markets as residual demand curves are more
steep, and so consumers in duopoly markets have a surplus that is $0.628 million/year
higher. Hence, the net decrease in consumer welfare from finer price discrimination is
roughly one third the aggregate change.
Even though a move from zone to market pricing has modest effects on variable profits,
it nevertheless results in a large redistribution among consumers. (The results are thus
28

We can isolate the cost impact by calculating equilibrium using costs that assume all drywall panels travel
the same distance to reach the stores. For 9.3% of observations, the direction of profits changes of moving to
finer pricing change sign without cost heterogeneity. Prices are slightly higher, but less dispersed, without cost
heterogeneity. Overall variable profits in the different counterfactuals still follow the same general patterns
as in Table 6. Similarly, we can isolate the impact of demand variations by calculating equilibrium after
assigning δ js = δ̄. This also results in the same general patterns of profit changes across pricing regimes.
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Table 7: Consumer Surplus and Variable Profit Changes
Uniform Pricing
Cons. Surplus Var. Profit

Market Pricing
Cons. Surplus Var. Profit

Monopoly Markets

418,766

-185,268

-1,555,205

709,275

Duopoly Markets

-229,321

150,600

628,984

-432,023

∆ Surplus

189,445

-34,668

-926,221

277,252

Total ∆ Surplus

154,777

-648,969

Notes: Consumer surplus and variable profit changes are annualized. Numbers in left two columns
are differences between equilibrium values in the (uniform, uniform) and (zone, zone) subgames.
Numbers in the right two columns are differences between the (market, market) and (zone, zone)
subgames.

like those in Miravete, Seim, and Thurk (2014), where a monopolist in Pennsylvania liquor
market can achieve small profit gains through finer pricing that have large distributional
consequences.) Here, consumers in monopoly markets lose more surplus than the combined surplus gain from consumers in duopoly markets and the profit gains to retailers.
This is especially remarkable since monopoly markets are each small and there are fewer
of them. The per capita effect in these monopoly markets is considerable, with the effect
in monopoly markets being on average ten times greater per person than the impact in
competitive markets. Overall, the markets that are harmed by market pricing are small,
rural towns, where the population is on average four times lower than markets with two
firms. Mean family incomes are similar; however, they are much more dispersed in the
rural markets. The main consequence of zone pricing, thus, is to shield small towns from
high prices where firms might otherwise exercise considerable market power. Doing so,
however, results in slightly higher prices, shared by a considerably larger population,
where firms compete.
Table 7 also shows the consequences of moving to uniform pricing would. We find a
similar pattern, but with smaller effects. Consumer surplus is $0.189 million/year higher in
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(uniform, uniform), a result that nets a larger transfer from duopoly markets to monopoly
markets. Consumer surplus is $0.418 million/year higher in monopoly markets and $0.229
million/year lower in duopoly markets. Consumer surplus changes are again larger and
in the opposite direction from combined retailer profit changes.

5.3

Pricing Regime Choice and Menu Costs

In Section 5.1 and Section 5.2, chains take price regimes as given. In reality, chains are
free to adopt uniform pricing or market pricing. They chose their current pricing zones,
and even here, there are millions of possible combinations (or more precisely, there are
over 2128 ). We cannot examine such a large game, but we can analyze payoffs presented
in Table 6 as a regime selection game. The strategies available to each chain are uniform
pricing, using the observed zones, or market-level pricing. We assume firms choose their
pricing systems simultaneously.
In the theoretical literature, Thisse and Vives (1988) establish conditions under which
market segmentation through zones may lead to a prisoner’s dilemma, where both firms
opt to price discriminate but receive lower profits than under uniform pricing. Table 6
shows market-level pricing to be the dominant strategy for both firms, and so (market,
market) is the pure strategy equilibrium of the regime selection game. Due to the asymmetries across our retailers, most notably in where they operate as monopolists, we find
that the equilibrium of the regime selection game only lowers profits for one chain. Yet,
neither firm has adopted market-level pricing.
Thus far, our model has assumed prices are set costlessly. The cost of maintaining
a market-level system, therefore, could explain why the chains choose their observed
zones over the dominant strategy of market-level pricing. Such costs could arise from the
managerial effort needed to set thousands of prices or from the changes to the technical
infrastructure needed to process fine pricing. Levy et al. (1997) and Zbaracki et al. (2004)
document the high cost of price setting in some firms. In macroeconomics, menu costs
often are thought to cause price rigidity and departures from what the equilibrium prices
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would be without such frictions. The spatial price rigidity of pricing zones could result
from similar considerations.
We can bound such costs by adding parameters to the payoff matrix in Table 6 to
account for them. In Table 8, both Home Depot and Lowe’s face a menu cost µ associated
with choosing a pricing system. The superscript denotes either uniform, zone, or market
pricing and the subscript denotes the firm. To bound the them, we adjust the parameters
such that (zone, zone) becomes an equilibrium of the game.
Table 8: Payoff Matrix with Menu Costs
L / HD

Uniform

Zone

Market

Uniform

2.215 − µU
, 4.522 − µU
L
HD

2.097 − µU
, 4.672 − µZHD
L

1.844 − µU
, 5.170 − µM
L
HD

Zone

2.222 − µZL , 4.500 − µU
HD

2.108 − µZL , 4.664 − µZHD

1.860 − µZL , 5.167 − µM
HD

Market

2.325 − µM
, 4.344 − µU
L
HD

2.220 − µM
, 4.519 − µZHD
L

1.995 − µM
, 5.055 − µM
L
HD

Notes: Profits are annualized and reported as millions of dollars.

Lowe’s will select zone pricing over market-level pricing only if If µM
− µZL > 0.112 and
L
over uniform pricing only if µM
− µU
< 0.011. Likewise, zone pricing is Home Depot’s best
L
L
response to Lowe’s using zone pricing only if µM
− µZHD > 0.503 and µM
− µU
< 0.164.29
HD
HD
HD
If the costs of implementing zone pricing µZ were a little larger relative to uniform
pricing, then (uniform, zone) or (uniform, uniform) would emerge as the equilibrium of
the regime selection game. In other categories, such as mosaic glass tile or power sanders,
that is what is observed.

5.4

Abstracting from Competitive Interaction

In the previous sections, we analyzed equilibrium prices so a chain’s prices reflected the
competitor’s pricing regime and pricing choices. Nash-Bertrand games are games of
29
If chains choose pricing regimes sequentially instead of simultaneously, then the difference in menu costs
needed to rationalize the observed zone choices differ. If Home Depot is a first mover, then µM
− µZL > 0.135
L
M
Z
and µHD − µHD > 0.391 are necessary for Home Depot to choose zone pricing over market-level pricing.
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strategic complements, so ignoring the competitive response overstates the gains of finer
pricing. Specifically, a firm would prefer to undercut the competition to divert sales, but in
equilibrium, competition will also adjust price downward. We present an exercise in which
one chain moves from zone to market-level pricing, while its competitor’s zone structure
and all prices are kept fixed. This exercise is most similar to the previous literature on
zone pricing, such as Chintagunta, Dubé, and Singh (2003), which was forced to abstract
from the competitive interaction due to data restrictions.
Table 9 compares the profit from this deviation, holding competitor prices fixed along
with profits accounting for the competitor response. Moving from the (zone, zone) equilibrium to the (zone, market) equilibrium would increase Lowe’s profit from $2.108 million/year to $2.220 million/year, a gain of $112 thousand/year. If Home Depot’s prices were
fixed, then, when moving from zone pricing to market-level pricing, Lowe’s still raises its
prices in monopoly markets, but it also could undercut Home Depot in markets where
they compete without provoking a response. Lowe’s profits would be $2.685 million/year,
an increase of $577 thousand/year over the zone-zone equilibrium, in this later scenario.
Although these changes seem small, in percentage terms, the overstatement in gains is
very large.
Table 9: Profits Under Deviations to Market Pricing
Firm / Strategy

Equilibrium
(Zonei , Zone−i )

Deviation
to Marketi

Equilibrium
(Marketi , Zone−i )

Profit
Overstatement

i =Lowe’s

2.108

2.685

2.220

5.15x

i =Home Depot

4.664

5.298

5.167

1.26x

Notes: Profits are annualized and reported as millions of dollars. Deviation profits are found by fixing
−i’s prices to equilibrium zone and then solving for i’s optimal market prices.

The second row conducts an analogous exercise – a move by Home Depot to marketlevel pricing holding Lowe’s prices fixed and then allowing them to adjust. We find the
overstatement in gains for Home Depot to be 26%. The number is substantially lower
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because our sample area contains several Home Depot monopoly stores that are shielded
from competitor response. Even so, the overstatement may also be large in absolute dollars
as our analysis focuses on a small subset (<.05%) of total products over a small proportion
(3%) of the chain’s networks. Although we do not have the data to conduct a national
analysis, we posit that the gains would be overstated to a larger extent in a national level
analysis due to the sheer number of competitive markets elsewhere in the country.
Another way of interpreting the profit overstatement in Table 9 is as an overstatement
of menu costs that we calculated in the previous section. The previous literature on
zone pricing necessarily found gains from finer pricing and forwarded menu costs as a
likely friction explaining why firms were not utilizing such pricing. Ignoring competition
estimates a lower bound on menu costs that is 1.26-5.15 times too high.

5.5

Store-Owner Pricing and an Agency Problem

Some chains give local store managers the autonomy to determine prices and assortments.
This is especially true in franchising, and its presence varies both within and across industries (Lafontaine and Shaw 2005). The practice of allowing local managers the autonomy
to choose prices is also observed in retail home improvement, notably at Ace Hardware.30
Home Depot and Lowe’s have chosen to centralize pricing, although historically, we know
Home Depot operated regional buying offices that oversaw activities in local markets.31
Our aim is to quantify how centralizing pricing affects the chains.
We simulate store prices and profits if both chains were to decentralize pricing. Specifically, we have each store maximize individual store profits. This would most closely
mimic an incentive scheme whereby store managers are rewarded for individual store
performance and not overall chain performance. Managers care only about store profits,
creating an agency problem as store managers now compete for sales with other chain
stores located in the same market (Brickley and Dark 1987).
30

Ace Hardware is a retail cooperative with over 4,700 stores (Ace Hardware 2016 Financial Report). Their
stores are considerably smaller than Home Depot, Menards and Lowe’s. They sell products in many of the
same categories as Home Depot and Lowe’s; however, they do not sell drywall.
31
Source: Home Depot Supplier Onboarding Guide, Summer 2013
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Figure 9 summarizes this exercise and compares it to the results of the previous exercises. It shows average store performance, as measured by two-week profits, for three
scenarios. The first panel corresponds to the (zone, zone) subgame. The second panel
corresponds to the (market, market) subgame. Finally, the third panel corresponds to the
store-owner exercise. For each plot, the horizontal axis corresponds to the average product price at the store and the vertical axis yields store variable profits. Since our sample
contains 128 stores, each panel contains 128 markers (circles or triangles), separated by
chain and market structure (triangle is monopoly; circle is duopoly). Color denotes the
chain.
Figure 9: Comparison of counterfactual prices and profits across stores

Notes: Results reported per store, averaged over time. Colors and shapes correspond to chain and market
structure, respectively.

The first panel shows the base case of zone pricing. There are several Home Depot
monopoly stores in their own zones, so while most of the dots are centered around $12, a
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few are closer to $22. When chains move to market pricing (second panel), all monopoly
stores that were originally a part of larger zones are free to exercise their monopoly power.
This causes every monopoly store (all triangles) to increase price and store profits increase.
For these stores, there is a shift to the upper-right going from panel one to panel two. As
discussed in Section 5.1, the stores in duopoly markets now compete more fiercely due
to strategic complementarity. In the figure, the average duopoly store (denoted by circles
and hexagons) decreases price, and profits dip slightly (4.4%). Relative to panel one, there
is a movement in these stores to the bottom left.
The final panel in Figure 9 shows the consequences of moving to store-owner pricing.
None of the monopoly stores adjusts price, as there are no monopoly markets where a
chain has two stores in the sample. Hence, the profit gains and consumer surpluses are
identical to those under market-level pricing. This means that all changes occur in duopoly
markets. There is a significant increase in price dispersion across stores (Lafontaine 1999),
much more so than when moving from zone to market pricing. There is considerable
movement to the left, as the average price drops by 4.6%. There is also considerable
movement downwards, as the increase in competition due to the agency problem leads to
a significant decline in profits. Compared to market pricing, store-owner pricing reduces
total profits in markets where other chain stores are present by 39.6% and 27.1%, for Lowe’s
and Home Depot, respectively. These stores make up a large proportion of the sample, so
the aggregate decline in industry profits is 14.7%. Out of all our counterfactual exercises,
this one has the highest increases of consumer surplus in duopoly markets and also the
highest aggregate consumer surplus. Profits are the lower than in all other counterfactuals.
This may be the reason our retailers have decided to centralize pricing.

6

Conclusion

In this article, we estimate the welfare effects of zone pricing in retail oligopoly. To perform
this analysis, we collect novel price and quantity data for the major home improvement
retailers, which assign constant prices across large geographically contiguous areas. Pric41

ing zones combine markets that differ in substantial ways, including market structure and
costs. We use the data to estimate an empirical model of zone pricing under competition.
With our estimates, we calculate equilibrium pricing under different pricing structures,
such as a move to a uniform price or further price discrimination to market-level pricing.
Our results highlight the importance of accounting for the competitive interaction in
retail pricing. We find that industry profits are higher under both uniform pricing and
market pricing, compared to the observed zones. Further, our analysis sheds light on
which consumer groups are most affected by zone pricing in oligopoly. There are clear
winners and losers of retail chains using zone pricing. We find that zone pricing shields
consumers in monopoly markets from facing high prices, but raises prices in markets
where firms compete. We estimate the aggregate profit effects to be small due to the
asymmetric price effects of moving to finer pricing.
Although we bring in new data in order to quantify the welfare effects, both the
methodology and data have limitations. As we do not have individual purchase data, we
abstract from features that may be important in retailing, such as consumer transportation
costs. The selected product category has the benefit of known and differential costs across
stores, but the products are not highly differentiated. Hence, the welfare effects of zone
pricing in other retail sectors is unclear. Moreover, online versus offline competition is
important to much of retailing. We can abstract from it for drywall, but it is likely an
important force in other categories.
Finally, we take the choice of zones and the set of products offered as exogenous – we
observe no changes to the pricing zones over the sample period. There may be important
interactions between the commitment to use zone pricing and product variety or the entry
of stores within and across chains. We also do not have the data to disentangle why zones
differ substantially across categories and firms. This could reflect differences in the competitive landscape, dictated by costs, demand, or contract negotiation. Another possible
explanation is managerial ability. Whatever the causes of zone pricing, the consequences
include welfare transfers and mitigation of monopoly power in some markets.
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A

Estimating Marginal Costs under Zone Pricing

The main results use cost estimates calculated from wholesale prices and transportation
costs. An alternative approach is to recover costs by imposing optimality conditions on
firm behavior. Here, we show how this approach can be extended to a model with zone
pricing.
When competing firms set prices at the store level, there is a one-to-one relationship
between optimality conditions and marginal costs. For example, in a single good setting,
the markup can be recovered through Lerner’s Index. The multi-product analog can be
seen in Nevo (2001) and Petrin (2002), among many other papers in the literature. If,
instead, firms choose zone prices, then each zone pricing decision generates a first order
condition that contains possibly several unobserved cost terms. Therefore, the number
of unknowns is possibly much larger than the number of optimality conditions (we have
dim(J × Z) optimality conditions to estimate dim(J × S) costs).
In order to estimate store-specific costs for firms using zone pricing, we assume
marginal costs can be written as
c js = w js θ + ν jz ,
where c js is marginal cost of product j in store s, w js are observable cost variables, such as
distance traveled from the manufacturing plant, and ν jz is the unobservable component of
marginal costs. This parameterization of costs differs from what is typically found in the
literature, because the unobservable is constant within a pricing zone. That is, we assume
ν jz instead of ν js .
To see the advantage of this approach, suppose the only variable affecting costs is
the distance between factory and store. Given a guess of the distance coefficient, costs
will vary by store. The remaining components of marginal costs, that are assumed to not
vary within a zone, can be inferred by solving the system of first order conditions (the
dimensionality of ν is equal to the dimensionality of the first order conditions). Hence,
our restriction on ν allows us, in a restricted way, to estimate dim(S × J) costs with only
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dim(Z × J) first order conditions.
Given any guess of θ, we can solve for ν. To estimate θ, we write the problem using
mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) following Su and Judd
(2012). Let M(θ; c, w) be a minimum distance estimator given the parameterization of c js ,
such as using least absolute deviations or least squares. The MPEC problem is to solve
min M(θ; c, w)
θ,c

s.t. FOC(c, θ ; w, x, p) = 0.
Critically, we must specify the components entering w as this is the only way to incorporate
store-level covariates into the estimation routine. This is in contrast with most of the
literature, where store-level costs are first recovered and then regressed on covariates.
With our drywall data, we include: driving distance from the closest plant via chain
distribution, local retail wages, and product-specific intercepts.32
Table 10: Marginal Cost Estimates
Coef.

Std. Error

Distance

0.0024

0.0019

Retail Wages

0.0000

0.0004

Product-Chain Indicators
Marginal Cost IQR

†

X
[3.66, 9.93]

Notes: Distance is computed as the driving distance to the store via the closest
chain distribution center. Retail wages are weekly retail wages computed
from BLS Occupational Employment and Wages. Standard errors computed
using block bootstrap with 1,000 repetitions. †: All products but two are
significant at the 1% level; average fitted value from wθ̂ is 6.54.

Table 10 shows the results of estimation. We estimate the transportation coefficient to
32
We have also estimated specifications including time fixed effects; the time coefficients are similar to each
other. We exclude any optimality conditions that involve a product observation with a demand elasticity
greater than -1 that are found in 4% of observations.
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be positive at 0.0024 per sheet/mile. While not significant (significant only in one-sided
test at 10%), this estimate is close to the shipping component of costs calculated with our
wholesale pricing data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The wage coefficient
is close to zero and is not statistically significant. Combining with prices, we estimate the
interquartile range of marginal costs to be between $3.66 and $9.93, and markups between,
$3.05 to $6.72.
The cost estimates are reasonable for most products, but for others the ν required to
make the optimality conditions hold are of sufficient magnitude to make the overall cost
estimates unreasonable. In 6.5% of observations, marginal costs estimates are negative, all
because of large negative ν terms. Large positive ν terms are also present; ν is more than
$5 in 3% observations, leading to unrealistically high cost estimates.
These large residuals may be because either: 1) the assumption of profit maximization
is not satisfied, 2) the restrictive assumption that the unobservable does not vary within
a zone is unreasonable. Finally, we note that while transportation costs closely follow
our wholesale price data, the overall estimated costs are on average $1 lower than those
calculated from wholesale prices. Our expectation is the opposite, as the wholesale calculations omit labor and opportunity costs. On the other hand, estimated costs could in
fact be lower if Home Depot and Lowe’s obtain wholesale prices significantly below the
national average. The wholesale quotes do not seem to be characterized by extreme price
dispersion, however.
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